![]() On Dennett’s view, the metaphysician becomes a diplomatic anthropologist who analyzes the use of metaphysical terms in the manifest image, but is not concerned with limning the ultimate structure of reality. Dennett (1991, 2013) argues that the perspective one should take with regard to metaphysical questions is to view them as questions arising in common situations in daily life. The large gap between the metaphysical concepts in physics and the folk metaphysical concepts leaves room for a descriptive analysis of our folk metaphysical notions. Important though these insights might be, they leave the layman perplexed, since it is hard to form a conception of the outside world without the more traditional metaphysical concepts. On Maudlin’s view (2007), physical laws are fundamental. For example, Ladyman and Ross (2007) no longer consider objects or things as the building blocks of external reality, but propose that structures constitute the most fundamental level of reality. 2 Another problem is that traditional metaphysical categories (object, property, cause, time.) are radically transformed within the context of physics. A common complaint is that the added value of metaphysical reflection within physics is not obvious. ![]() The metaphysics of physics is not without its detractors though. Most of the proponents of naturalized or scientific metaphysics consider the fundamental theories of physics as the appropriate starting point for metaphysics. In view of the alleged fickleness of conceptual analysis, it has been argued that metaphysics should become scientific (see Maudlin, 2007 Ross et al., 2013). Several authors (e.g., Ladyman and Ross, 2007 Unger, 2014) argue that an a priori analysis of metaphysical concepts cannot yield substantive results. Most results in metaphysics are based on conceptual analysis and on the further formalization of insights gained by conceptual analysis. Metametaphysics in a narrow sense is concerned with these changes in the standard metaphysical framework.Ī second and more serious concern is that many philosophers and scientists regard the methodology of analytic philosophy as deeply flawed. To this end, typically, extra metaphysical concepts such as “fundamentality” ( Sider, 2011) or “grounding” ( Fine, 2001) are invoked. Many contemporary philosophers now defend the view that improvements and/or additions to the formal framework should be made so that a clear distinction between substantive and shallow metaphysical questions can be drawn. 1 For example, Quine (1981, 124), who defends this broad conception of physical objects, explicitly accepts that “here is a physical object part of which is a momentary stage of a silver dollar now in my pocket and the rest of which is a temporal segment of the Eiffel Tower through its third decade.” If every part of space-time contains an object, the concept of objecthood becomes void. One strategy is to allow unrestricted composition, but it is readily seen that this leads to a deflationary view in which ontological questions become shallow. ![]() It proves to be hard to find general (mereological) principles that express which composed entities are entities in their own right over and above the parts that constitute them. ![]() Physical objects are in general composed of parts, e.g., a watch can be taken apart in several components, which again can be composed of smaller components. ![]() A vivid example is the problem of composition. The framework of logic facilitated a formal rigor previously unattainable, but quickly led to new problems and deflationary views. Quine proposed his famous criterion of ontological commitment “to be is to be the value of a variable,” which states that we are ontologically committed to the entities that are in the range of the existential quantifier in the logical formulations of our best scientific theories. In the 20th century, (analytic) metaphysics, and in particular ontology, became tightly wedded to modern logic ( Russell, 1918/2010 Wittgenstein, 1922 Quine, 1948). The interest in metametaphysics is indicative of some problems at the core of the metaphysical project.Ī first problem is that many metaphysicians no longer consider the standard formal metaphysical framework adequate. They want to know whether metaphysical questions are substantive and how to gain metaphysical knowledge, whereby one might consider common sense, conceptual analysis, or quasi-scientific procedures ( Chalmers et al., 2009). Whereas metaphysicians are interested in the foundations of reality, metametaphysicians are interested in the foundations of metaphysics itself. In recent years there has been an outspoken interest in the methodology of metaphysics in the emerging field of metametaphysics. ![]()
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |